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Summary  findings
Governments should increasingly be able to rely on the  adequately ernphasizing contract design that anticipates
private sector for lielp supporting (and financing) the  problems and addresses unpredictable  situations. This
transport sector - especially infrastructure support  increases the risk of arbitrary regulatory rulings, which
services for which there is heavy demand - but first they  increases regulatory and political risks, wvhich  raises the
must improve their regulatory tools and sort out the  expected rate of return required by potential  investors.
institutional mess surrounding the regulatory process.  And all that makes future projects costlier or more
Some countries have put together creative restructuring  difficult, adding to the effects of the  1998-99  financial
models and financing designs that tap potential  in the  crisis.
private sector.  As a result of increased risk, the two groups most
Roads will continue to need significant public funding,  interested in the sector are:
but there are innovative ways (including shadow tolls) to  Large, strong operators in the sector - typically in
attract private financing for road maintenance and  tandem with local construction  companies  -that  feel
investment.  confident they can take on regulators in case of conflict.
Partnerships between the public and private -ectors  *  Risk-takers carving a niche for themselves.
have remained largely untapped at ports and airports.  Either way, taxpayers and transport users are exposed
To attract more private capital to the sector, regulators  to government,  regulator, or operator  failures that result
must know the cost of capital, know how to be fair to  in contract renegotiations (the norm, rather  than the
captive shippers, and have a better handle on demand - exception,  in transport infrastructure projects).
so they have more credibility when conflicts arise.  Gains from privatization might not reach consumtiers,
Governments have overemphasized making deals and  simply because governments are ignoring the importance
have generally underestimated the difficulty of taking on  of ensuring fair distribution  of long-run gains through
their new job as regulators. They are increasingly  the early creation of independent and accountable
switching to contract-based regulation, to firm up the  regulatory institutions that work closely with effective
commitments of all parties involved, but are no:  competition agencies.
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6370, fax 202-334-8350,  email address gchenet@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research Working Papers are also posted on the
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The  1990s have  seen  a dramatic  increase  in the  liberalization  of transport  policies,  thus
strengthening the return of private operators and investors in transport infrastructure in the world,
as already  noted by  Gomez-Ibanez and  Meyer  (1993) for the  1980s. 2 As  with  many economic
changes with a strong market orientation,  the process started in the U.S.  In the  1980s, Presidents
Reagan and Bush continued a  deregulation process initiated in the late  1970s by the Democratic
administration  (air in  1978, rail and trucking in  1980). The move was soon followed by the U.K.
and also  in Latin  America  and in to a large extent in East Asia.  In these countries,  changes in
ideology about the role of the state and unhappiness with the quality of service provided by public
monopolies played a clear  role in stimulating the return of private  transport operators.  However,
the main driving force for many developing countries has generally been some type of fiscal crisis.
The need to cut public expenditures forced pragmatic governments to turn to the private  sector for
assistance  in  financing the tremendous  investment requirements  in  infrastructure-equivalent,  on
average,  to 4-6 percent of GDP/year  in developing countries for the foreseeable future--freeing up
shrinking  public  resources  to  finance  deficits,  service  debts  and,  in  principle,  under-funded
I would like to thank J. Campos, J. Carbajo, G. de Rus, N. De Castro, J.A. Gomez-Ibanez, K. Gwilliam, M. Juhel,  J.J. Laffont, G.
Nombela,  0.  Betancour, John Strong , L. Thompson and L Trujillo for many suggestions and/or discussions on many of the issues
covered in this paper. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in the paper are, however, entirely mine. They do not
necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
2Many  casual observers do not know that this is indeed a return of the private sector 50 years after the nationalization of the private
monopolies that had created the first railways, bus companies, and even some major airports, ports and roads, in developing countries
in particular. The nationalization took place in most Western countries in between the two World Wars as part of the larger role of
government decided as a result of the economic depression of the 1930s and with the increase in the number of socialist administrations
in many European countries. In developing countries, it took place a bit later as one of the high profile actions viewed by the new
independent governments as necessary to end their status as colonies.activities such as education and health, although there is no strong evidence that this actually took
place.
The  necessity of increased private  sector involvement in transport  infrastructure  does not
mean that the role of the public sector is over. It will continue to have to finance many projects too
risky to attract private investment at viable rates of return.  It will also continue to have to define
policies and strategies for the sector. The main change is that it must replace its previous  role as a
self-regulated  provider  of  services with  that  of  a  new  role  as  an  independent regulator  of  the
significant number of activities delivered by private operators.  This new role is important because
not  every  transport  activity  is  competitive.  In  fact,  transport  restructuring  often  creates  local
monopolies or oligopolies in transport infrastructures.  Moreover,  even when competition can work
because  entry  is feasible  and  desirable,  public  regulation  of  safety or  service  quality  is  often
needed to ensure that operators do not cut costs through these quality variables.  The international
experience of the 1990s suggests that while the transfer of operations from public to private hands
is reasonably smooth on average, the transition of the public sector from self regulated operator to
independent regulator of private monopolies and other market failures is proving to be much more
challenging than anticipated. This changed governmental role still requires significant adjustments
in  many  countries  ensure  that  the  expected  efficiency  and  financing  payoffs  of  private  sector
participation can be sustained.
This  paper takes stock of the main achievements and highlights the major challenges that
governments are likely to face in taking on their new role in this sector. It is organized as follows:
Section 2 gives a  snapshot of the main transactions resulting in increased  private participation  in
transport  during  the  1990s;.  Section 3 advances impressions  about the  impact of the  1998-1999
financial crisis in emerging economies on the prospects for future private participation in transport;
2Section 4 provides  some  evidence on the forms  of private  sector participation  that results  from
restructuring across regions; Section 5 presents the ways in which competition has been introduced
in transport;  Section 6 discusses the new role for  government and identifies the main challenges
that  will have to  be addressed  soon to ensure  that the gains achieved through  additional private
involvement  are more  than just  additional  investments and that  all users  share  in  the long-run
benefits;  Section 7 provides some concluding thoughts.
2. Global  Trends  in Private  Participation  in Transport  Infrastructure
A useful, even quite imperfect, indicator of the outcome of the deregulation wave over the
last fifteen years  is the number of new transport infrastructure projects  considered by the private
sector.3 Between  1985  and  October  1998,  Public  Works  Financing  estimated  that  1,004  new
transport  projects  worth  U.S.$580  billion  were  planned  and/or  financed  around  the  world.4 Of
those,  about half were toll roads,  a quarter were  rail projects,  and the rest were  airport and port
projects.  An interesting detail is that less than 25 percent of these projects were under construction
at  the  end  of  1998,  suggesting  that  while  deregulation  can  generate  enthusiasm,  it  does  not
guarantee  disbursement by  the  private  sector.  A  more detailed  look  at the  differences  between
developed and developing economies can provide useful insights.
2.1. Developed Economies
Table  1 shows  that  developed  countries  generated  only  about 25  percent  of  the  newly-
planned privatization projects over  the last fifteen years.  The amounts involved are significant in
Clearly this is an imperfect indicator since the emergence of transport projects has a great deal to do with developments in the capital
markets, especially local markets. It is not clear what share of investment is stimulated by privatization rather than by deregulation.
Moreover, the strict comparison of numbers across sectors has to be quite cautious since in some sectors such as roads the count of
projects will tend to be much higher than in others such as railways for obvious reasons.
3terms of value, representing about 40 percent of the total value of planned projects for the world.
This suggests that the average project size in developed countries is much larger than in developing
countries, where 75 percent  of the world's planned projects take place with only 60 percent  of the
world's total dollar amount.
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Table 1 also shows that the pioneering actions of the U.S.  found followers not only in the
U.K.-in  fact, the most active project generator-  but also in Australia where national as well as
sub-national deregulation has resulted in a large number of new private initiatives. In Europe,
deregulation in most Anglo-Saxon, Nordic and Southern European countries has generated many
new private projects in rail and roads. The rest of continental Europe is preparing to follow, under
The EEC liberalization efforts in transport services started in 1986 with the decision to have an "interior" space with free circulation
of goods and services. Progress was slow but by 1998, air transport and freight transport by road had been fully liberalized. Much less
progress has been achieved in railways despite discussions that began as early as 1991 with the request of the accounting separation of
the infrastructure and other businesses. Since then most of the progress has been on the definition of access rules. Another major
achievement has been the harmonization of many technical norms.
4the stimulus of an EEC push to liberalize the sector.6 From a sub-sectoral viewpoint, it is clear that
toll roads and rail projects attract the most attention, while older ports do not seem to need many
new investments in developed countries. Airport projects are mainly concentrated in Australia, the
U.K.  and the U.S.
2.2. Developing Economies
Table 2 summarizes a database put together by the World Bank for developing countries. Its
coverage is somewhat different from the Public Works database, with a focus on actual deals rather
than  planned  projects.  It  covers  all  divestitures,  concessions/franchises  and  operation  and
maintenance contracts signed in the developing world between 1990 and 1997, a period when most
of  the projects  covered  by  the Public  Works  database  took  place  in  developing  and  transition
economies.'  The  values  listed  in  the  table  show  the  actual  investments  the  private  sector  has
committed by contract to deliver. During this decade, private operators have committed themselves
to  invest about U.S.$65  billion  in  transport  infrastructure in  the short  to  medium  run-about  1
percent of the total GNP of developing countries. 8
The  table  reflects  the  significant  role  that  private  sector  participation  can  have  in  the
transport sector when partnership with government is based on strong mutual commitments to joint
work.  This  role  is  particularly  important  in  areas  and  activities  where  demand is  strong  and
therefore  commercial risk is manageable. This is illustrated by the number of projects and the new
6The  EEC liberalization efforts in transport services started in 1986 with the decision to have an "interior'  space with free circulation
of goods and services. Progress was slow but by 1998, air transport and freight transport by road had been fully liberalized. Much less
progress has been achieved in railways despite discussions that began as early as 1991 with the request of the accounting separation of
the infrastructure and other businesses. Since then most of the progress has been on the definition of access rules. Another major
achievement has been the harmonization of many technical norms.
The Asian crisis made the year 1998 a low in terms of project activity and new transactions in infrastructure throughout the world.
To put these numbers in perspective, it may be worth reminding the reader that the 1997 GNP for developing countries was about
US$6,000 billion, while the world GNP was about US$30,000 billion.  This suggests that private financing will continue to be a minor
part of the investment requirements of the infrastructure as a whole, although it is concentrated in activities that meet the highest
demand segments of the transport sector.
5investment  that  transport  reform,  coupled  with  macroeconomic  adjustments,  brought  to  Latin
America  and  East Asia between  1990 and  1997.9 Indeed,  these two regions  attracted  almost 90
percent  of  all transactions  and  about 94  percent  of  all  investment  commitments.  Both  regions
benefited from a tremendous boom in demand during the 1980s and many investors believed  that
they could do  no wrong  in regions that had  apparently learned to  manage  their  macroeconomic
problems and were benefiting from ease borrowing terms allowed by top credit  rating and excess
supply of capital flows in the world.
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The sectoral distribution  is just  as skewed toward rail and road deals as it is in developed
countries because public rail services tend to be equally poor in both country groups.  Cutting rail
and road transport costs is a major concern1  which requires significant investment to rehabilitate and
improve  overall  operational  performance.  It  is becoming  increasingly  clear  to  governments  that
both  efficient  logistics  and  the  opporlunity  for  multimodal  arrangements  are  essential  to
9With the macroeconomnic  problems  of 1998,  the project  flows  dried up.
10  With the macroeconomic  problems  of 1998,  the project  flows dried  up.
6competitiveness. This means improving rail service rather than relying on trucks for long distance
freight  transport.  Similarly,  congestion  accessing  large  cities  and  between  large  cities  is
increasingly  common  throughout  the  world.  The  main  difference  between  developing  and
developed countries is that emerging economies are  also seeing significantly more activity in the
port sector over the last year -again  demonstrating the need to address high logistic costs.
The most perceivable outcome of these changes is that the private sector will be responsible
for large shares of transport  services. Over 30 percent of railway services are now under  private
operations  around  the  world-in  total  km  and  passenger/km.n" Operations  and  investment  in
airports and ports are increasingly in private hands in the OECD countries of Latin America and
East Asia,  with the U.S.  being the exception. However,  this is still a far cry from being a typical
situation.  Even in the roads sector,  where public investments will continue to be  needed for low
traffic roads, toll roads are becoming increasingly important and are increasing shares of all traffic
needs, such as in Argentina and some parts of Brazil. It is not too risky to predict that this trend is
likely  to  continue  as the demand  for  transport services continues  to grow  much  faster than the
government's  ability to  raise the resources  to  finance  it. This  is no  longer the  dogmatic debate
comparing  public  vs.  private  providers  that  it  may  have  been  after  the  privatization  wave
introduced  by the Thatcher administration in the U.K.  For many countries  it is now a matter of
necessity,  as  governments  can no  longer afford  to  be  the sole  operator  and financier  of  costly
12 transport infrastructures.
Most  governments  have  recently  come to  similar  conclusions after  studying  these  early
experiences.  About 73 percent  of these projects  actually took place  during the second half of the
That figure is over 65 percent in Latin America.
12 In addition to the long run fiscal gains achieved through a reducing the need to finance the sector's expansion, for many
governments, in particular those in developing countries, "privatization" transaction is often designed to also generate revenue to
address short to medium term fiscal needs.
7period covered by the sample (between 1995 and 1997). In fact, about 45 percent of the investment
commitments have been made since 1996, with about 30 percent  in  1997 alone. This  also shows
that  it takes time to  work out the contracts that support the project  ideas. It may also  reflect the
steep learning curve both government and private operators must travel to learn to work with each
other in an uncertain world. And as the 1998 crisis showed, it is quite easy for the private  sector to
stop  contract  negotiations when  the  surrounding  macroeconomic  environment  is  not  supportive
enough.
3. Prospects for Private Participation in Transport After the 1998-99 Financial Crisis
It is difficult to review the experience of this decade and use it to draw conclusions for the
future  without  considering  the  consequences of  the recent  developments  in  emerging  financial
markets,  since these  introduce  conditions not  reflected in the  1990-1997 data  discussed  above. 13
These new conditions are likely to change the prospects of effective private financing of transport
projects for the next two to three years. Large portfolio outflows in emerging market funds mean that
the sources of international equity and debt capital that became available in the mid-1990s will for
some time be sharply curtailed for all but the most creditworthy projects for some time. The crisis
will also influence the demand for many of the transport services. Remember, transport is a "derived
demand": if growth slows, the transport sector does not do well either. This is in fact a much more
serious problem since experience suggests that privatizing teams have tended to overestimate demand
in the transport sector, probably more than in any other sector. What does this mean for the future?
The most obvious impact of financial tension in this sector is the increase in the risk level.
Premiums for commercial  (remember demand), regulatory (remember the institutional  problems),
13 Consider also that any real economic effects from these financial events have particular consequences for the transport sector.  Since
transport is a derived demand, any decline in real economic activity will quickly be felt in traffic levels and revenues.  These effects
8political  (as always,  in  uncertain times)  and currency risks all  have risen  significantly  in  1999.
Damage also comes from added restrictions on financing options. First, the costs of debt finance have
not only increased for most developing economies, but also for some of the developed economies in
Asia. Transport projects that have significant commercial risk will face higher interest rates, with
debt premiums  for  political,  currency, regulatory  and  sectoral  risk. Depending on  the  particular
project, rates of LIBOR plus ten percent should not be unexpected in many developing countries. and
this means that only the very best projects will find a market.
Moreover, higher levels of equity are likely to be required for many projects. In Brazil, for
instance, projects that were being structured with as much as 70 percent debt, 30 percent equity in
mid-1998 are now being discussed at a minimum of 50 percent debt, 50 percent equity. Also, rapid
outflows from emerging market funds and developing infrastructure funds have reduced the ability of
sponsors to tap them as equity sources. As a result, infrastructure projects are increasingly looking
primarily to construction and engineering companies as sources of equity. The problem is that the
incentive for these parties is to earn enough profit on the construction activity to justify the upfront
equity investment required. When projects were being financed with 70 percent debt, sharing in the
30 percent equity component could be justified, especially when construction companies generally
put  in  about half the equity.  With up to  50 percent equity required,  construction profits  are not
adequate to earn a minimally-required return. In fact, the higher required rates of return on debt mean
that even if the old capital structure mix could be maintained, construction company equity holders
will now require a much greater ongoing revenue stream to make such projects meet hurdle rates.
Second, the available maturity period of permanent debt instruments is likely to shorten for
many  borrowers.  In  countries  without  domestic  long-termn capital  markets,  many  transport
concessions  use  bridge  financing  until  the  construction  period  is  completed.  At  that  point,
vary by sector, especially over the medium to longer term.  Particularly hard-hit should be toll roads and passenger air transport, which
are extremely sensitive to income levels. This further reinforces the need to think of government involvement in the sector.
9concessionaires look to convert to permanent financial structures. Stability concerns have tended to
shorten many lenders'  horizons to five years, compared to as much as ten years recently. This is a
major problem for many infrastructure projects. Even with construction grace periods, many projects
take three to five years to reach volumes that are self-supporting.
These problems suggest that, in addition to a new role as regulator, governments need to go
back to  more fully defining their new role in co-financing the sector. It is increasingly clear that
governments will have to be closer partners with the private sector. Since the beginning of this new
privatization wave they have been present through implicit or explicit guarantees, and often picked up
the tab in the form of subsidies when risks became realities and additional financing was needed. But
this  need is now likely to  be  stronger and they must consider providing explicit and  transparent
government guarantees or contributing more to the equity of the projects. This is what the Brazilian
development  BNDES  is  doing  by  buying,  on  average,  21  percent  of  the  shares  in  Brazil's
privatization.
In  Latin America,  these actions can result in  a fall of the  risk premiums  by two to  four
percent. While this may make the project more feasible, it would not provide the government with the
required equity returns. The real value to government investment would be if it allowed for both a
higher share of debt and a lower required-return on private equity. This does not appear to be the case
in current capital market conditions. Rather, it serves to "buy down"  project size to make it more
attractive to private capital. As said at the beginning, this is the main purpose of the reforms to begin
with!
104. Revealed  Preferences  for Forms  of Private  Sector  Participation  in Transport
The figures quoted so far are providing a somewhat excessively aggregated review of the
privatization experience in the transport sector. As already mention,  privatization is quite a borad
concept that hides many forms of private participation. The review of the distribution of the forms
of private participation across sectors and regions is the main purpose of this section.
There  are  four  broad  categories  of  contractual  arrangements used  to  get the  private  sector
involved in any sector:  14
*  Divestiture:  this  is the  actual  sale of public  assets  to  the private  sector.  It  can  take  many
forms-public  offerings of shares, or private trade sales of assets themselves.
*  Greenfield projects:  this covers brand new investment projects which are commissioned to the
private  sector (Build-Operate and Transfer are among the most common).  The development of
new project  finance techniques,  as a  way of reducing,  or at least better  allocating,  the risks
involved in financing new infrastructure projects,  is one of the reasons why greenfield projects
have been  so successful.  This  is also  why the  specific design of unbundling  the sector is  so
important  that sometimes it must be  tailored to the marketability of an  activity from  a project
finance perspective to manage the risks
*  Operations and Maintenance  (O&M) contracts: these are essentially contracts to allow a private
operator  to  manage  (i.e.  operate  and  maintain)  the  service  but  do  not  include  investment
obligations.  These contracts are typically of short to medium duration (2-5 years) and generally
the government continues to take on all risk involved in the project.
*  Concession contracts  (or franchises):  these are usually  longer term contracts  of  10-30 years,
which  pass on the  responsibility for  O&M to  a  private  operator  and  include detailed  lists  of
14  For more details see Shaw, Gwilliam and Thompson (1996), or Gwilliam (1998) and the World Bank Transport Division Web site.
11investment  and  service  obligations.  In  this  case,  the  government  generally  passes  on  the
commercial risks to the private operator. For many  governments it also has the advantage that it
does not imply a politically sensitive transfer of ownership of public assets to the private sector;
assets are "rented"  out.
In developed countries,  asset sales (most obvious in Australia and continental Northern Europe)
and concessions/franchises  (in the U.K.,  Southern Europe and Canada) have been sharing most of
the business in transport.  The relative importance of BOTs (Build-Operate and Transfer) types of
projects is likely to increase as a result of the Blair administration's  Private Finance Initiative" 5. In
the Anglo-Saxon world and in Germany suggests that even local governments are interested in this
form  of infrastructure  financing.  Urban  roads  in the  U.K.  and  Australia  are  increasingly  being
marketed for what the U.K.  calls public-private partnerships-essentially,  design-build-finance and
operate  deals.  Under  these  deals, private  sector contractors  take a  large  share  of  the risks that
would  otherwise  be  have  to  be  assumed  fully  by  the  government,  and  therefore  face  strong
incentive to effectively interact with the local tax-payers.
In developing  and  transition  economies,  concessions  are the  most  common  form  of  private
sector participation in transport.  Table 3 illustrates this for developing  countries in general.  The
table  also  shows  that  while  Latin  America  and  East  Asia  are  the  most  active  in  promoting
concessions,  greenfield projects have been quite successful in East Asia over the last fifteen years
or so. This trend has been hit by the recent Asian financial crisis,  which has essentially frozen most
project finance activities in the developing world, resulting in the reallocation of financing flows to
developed  countries.  For  example,  Canada  recently closed  one  of the  most  creative  toll  road
12designs,  and  countries  like  Australia  and  Portugal,  who have  strong  political  commitments  to
increased private sector participation are riding a wave of BOTs and concessions in transport.
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The  Middle  East  has  been  the  least  effective (or  maybe  the  least  interested)  at  building  a
partnership  with the private  sector in transport,  although there was some activity in private ports,
as well  as the  recent  concession of the  Aqaba railway  in  Jordan.  South Asia and  Africa  come
next-including  the successful bi-national railway concession between Abidjan and Ouagadougou.
Part  of  the problem  is  that  in  these  regions  most  types  of  risks  levels,  not  only  political  and
regulatory,  but  also  commercial,  are  high.  The  ability  to  pay  for  transport  services  in  many
countries  of  this  region  is  very  modest,  implying  that tariffs  for  most  passenger  services,  for
instance,  have to  be  quite  low.  This,  in turn,  implies rather  long-run  commitments  in  order  to
recover  investments.  But  there  seems to  be  a  strong  hope  for  change  in both  regions.  Recent
projects in Cote d'Ivoire  may provide a glimpse of things to come: the airport was concessioned, a
major toll road is now in the hands of a private (construction) company and the port is about to be
concessioned as well." 6 Stories like this can be told for at least a dozen African countries, indicating
that the market seems to have found ways to mitigate the risk and is now convinced that it can deal
The PFI began with three types of contracts: concessions, joint ventures and public sector sole buyer of service (even if the
contractor is sometimes allowed to generate third party income from assets). The last form is the most innovative, as it generates the
most for taxpayers in terms of value for money.  For details, see Wilson (1999).
16The decline of "real equity" in road projects, i.e. the increasingly strong presence of construction companies, is seen by many as a
fact of life because it is quite rare to get interets from pure financial invetsors to face the risks characterizing toll roads.
13with  the political  and  regulatory  risk  that  is  often believed  to  be  much  higher  in  Africa  than
anywhere else in the world.
Table 4 shows that from a sectoral perspective, concession contracts have overwhelmingly
been the preferred form of privatization for all sectors except ports.  In ports,  which happens to be
the sector with the highest share of O&M projects,  contracts are slightly dominated by greenfield
projects.  Much of the other data is somewhat surprising. The airport  industry,  although generally
viewed as a relatively low risk industry characterized by good long term growth prospects,  has not
yet delivered on its promises  in terms of private sector participation. Better yet, traffic growth has
been strong,  and most experts agree that it is expected to continue to be strong for the foreseeable
future.  One explanation may be that the military has had a strong say-and  often a good financial
cut-in  this  sector and therefore  tends to be  reluctant to  relinquish this profit.  Also,  the modest
performance of ports  in attracting private  sector interest reflects the strong role of unions in this
sector. Initially, many are not interested in giving up the rents that their control of the sector often
yields. In Brazil, where unions have traditionally been quite strong,  in the posts sector, the unions
are now working with logistics companies to develop win-win reforms to  create business that can
rehire excess labor from the more traditional port activities.
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Overall,  a recent  development is that divestiture is generally picking up  in transport  as a
result of increased activity in the airport sector. Even in Asia where the financial cirsis hit hardest,
14the growth  in  airport projects  is quite obvious.  Malaysia,  Thailand, Korea,  even Japan have all
plans for new airports. Many airport deals in developed countries are being offered as divestitures
rather  than concessions, a trend that may spread to developing  . A complementary change in the
sector  is  the  growth  in  efforts  to  obtain  private  financing  of  relatively  small  projects  (cargo
facilities,  catering facilities,  ...) to complement the public financing of the core structures. All this
makes up for strong interest in small project financing as well.  One indicator of this trend is that
many investment banks are reorganizing their airport advisory units to support more divestiture in
addition to project  finance activities.  Another trend being set by the airport sector is that current
operators,  such as Schiphol in the Netherlands, Frankfurt, Rome, Toronto and London, are present
in most bids in developing countries. Most U.S.  and U.K.  rail or ports operators are present in the
key rail bids  as well.  In the roads sector,  it is difficult to  find an example where  the main  local
construction companies are not involved. This suggests some degree of continuity within the roads
sector, since in many countries these local companies were contracted by public works departments
to build, operate and maintain many of the roads before they were concessioned On the other hand,
this  may also  raise  concern  since it could  also indicat collusion between  the government  and  a
private sector partner.
5. How competition enters transport infrastructures
Historically,  the  economic  and  political  reasons  for  public  interest  in  transport  (scale
economies, externalities, national security) led most countries to public enterprises or to ministerial
control.  The U.S.  was the only country where the choice had  been to rely  on regulated private
provision.  Since the  academic debate  on the potential gains  from  sectoral reform  started  in the
U.S.,  the initial debates began with a discussion of the need to introduce more competition in the
15market.  In the U.S.,  this was done by eliminating restrictions to entry (such as entry licenses) and
restrictions  on  operating  rights,  in addition to  eliminating strict price  and  quality  controls.  The
motives for liberalizing the sector appeared to be  quite obvious, not  only to most economists but
also  to  casual  observers.  This  is  because in  the  U.S.,  the  static  and  dynamic  efficiency  gains
expected from  increased competition-i.e.  lower costs, fewer price-driven  distortions, better  user
service  orientation,  demand-driven  investment  strategies-had  been,  and  continue  to  be,  well
publicized  among  the  public  at  large  through  extensive  media  coverage  by  the  reforming
government.  But the experience of the U.S.  may be an outlying one,  and therefore  less relevant
than more recent experiences since privatization was not an issue the reformers  had to deal with.
Indeed, in the rest of the world, the initial conditions were that all transport infrastructures  tended
to be run by strong public monopolies. In that sense,  the U.K.  and Chilean reform experiences are
more representative  of what is now happening around the world.17 What was most relevant in the
U.K.  and Chile, from the viewpoint of the followers, was that these two experiences made it clear
that for countries with the most standard initial conditions of the transport sector-i.e.  strong public
monopolies unable to invest because of fiscal rationing-,  there could be no liberalization without
considering some type of restructuring in the sector.
This  is  why the  first  question any reformer  aiming at increased  competition  in transport
should look into is the extent to which a restructuring of the sector is needed and/or is possible to
make the most of the opportunities offered by a reasonable degree of competition in the sector. In
practice,  restructuring  generally implies some degree of unbundling of the activities performed  in
each  sub-sector.  This  is  much  more  than  a  simple  accounting  separation  which  maintains  a
monopoly  in  place.  It  consist  in an  actual disintegration  of the monopoly  into various  business
17In  addition, their experiences with privatization also show that there is more to reform in the transport sector than just efficiency.
16units.  The restructuring can be horizontal so that the effectiveness of various companies delivering
similar activities can be compared. This is common in railways, ports and airports. Unbundling can
also  be  vertical  and  determine  the extent  to  which  a  single  firm  can  participate  in  different
vertically  related  stages  of  production.  Vertical  unbundling  is  often handy  in  efforts  to  try  to
mitigate risks since often risks levels for potential investors are different at the various  stages of
production.  For instance,  the risks involved in investing in an airport  terminal are often less than
the risks  involved in investing in  a new runway.  These two investments  have a  clear  degree  of
complementarity by have different degree of attractiveness to private investors.  18
When  unbundling  leads  to  competitive  business  units  in  overlapping  segments  of  the
business  (as may be  the case for bus  services), competition  in the market  is a  natural  outcome
which minimizes the residual role for government. 19  But when competition in the market is limited
-i.e  that  the  scope  for  horizontal  unbundling  is  limited--  and  when  the  market  structure  still
includes a local monopoly after the unbundling has been implemented,  competition for  the market
through auctions can be designed to achieve many-but  seldom all-of  the gains from competition.
The management  of these auctions is quite complex and demanding  and  the outcome requires  a
strong government presence to ensure that the commitments made by the winners of the auctions
are met and that the gains from competition for the market are real rather than potential. .
Indeed, many would argue that the U.K. and Chilean reforms were also a more philosophical change of heart on the role and capacity
of the government in providing public services.
18 In addition, unbundling can have political advantages. It can indeed also be a way of getting rid of vested interest and introducing
a new governance structure for the sector,  which reinforces the purely competitive and commercial incentives for restructuring.
19 Checking for safety, environmental concerns and predatory behavior determine the bulk of the activities the government must focus
on.
175.1 Experiences informs  of unbundling to make the most of competition
Since the diversity of experiences shows that it is possible to slice the transport pie in many
ways, it is useful to understand why different governments use different methods to unbundle the
sector.  Indeed,  the  international  experience  suggests that  the  type  and  degree  of  competition
achieved by unbundling depends not  only on the classical trade-off between internal and external
efficiency,20 but also on the risk level perceived by the potential private operators since, after all,
attracting them to finance what the government can no longer afford to finance is the name of the
game. 21 When  economies  of  scale are  not  too  strong  with  respect  to  the  size  of  the  market,
unbundling  can  reduce  the  aggregate  commercial  risk  level  perceived  by  private  investors.
Competition for  the market in  each activity can be  expected to  be  sufficient to  promote  overall
efficiency.  Unbundling  stops  at  the  level  of  activity  which  requires  some  type  of  material
infrastructure (rail tracks, roads) that would make no sense to duplicate in a competitive environment.
Moreover,  too  much unbundling can hurt,  as it reduces the opportunity  for  risk hedging  across
activities in highly risky situations, or it reduces the opportunity to optimize economies of scale and
scope.  This may be  why in many smaller economies-and  there  are many in Africa and  Central
America-  much less unbundling has taken place than in the Latin American  Southern Cone  and
East Asia.
The  creativity  of  the  reformers  is  best  seen  in  an  overview  of  the  various  sectoral
experiences.22 In railways, the  service can be  unbundled vertically,  separating track  from rolling
stock, as was done in the U.K. It can also be separated horizontally (regional lines) as in the U.S.,
Mexico and Argentina. This allows the organization of competition for  the market while bidding out
20 Internal efficiency refers to the relative choice of inputs by firms, while external efficiency refers to their sale and pricing policies.
All project managers assess the cost of capital, which reflects various types of risk: commercial (including the risk of not being paid
by users who were used to highly subsidized rates under the public monopoly), regulatory risk (what happens if the regulator has mood
swings?) and political risk (what happens if the govemment changes?).
18the rights to deliver the services and also providing an opportunity to rely on competition between
markets. No country, outside the U.S. to a lesser extent, Australia, has actually made a serious effort
to compare regional operators in terms of efficiency in this sector. Finally, to minimize the risks of
cross-subsidies that  distort  investment decisions, some  countries have  also  separated freight  and
passenger rail as in Brazil and Argentina.
Similar strategies are observed in roads, where horizontal separation allows the promotion of
competition between markets to complement the effects of competition for the markets, which is built
into the design of auctions. This horizontal separation into corridors has been quite common in Latin
America. In Latin America and also in Asia, some degree of vertical separation has been observed
when, for large cities,  access roads to inter-urban roads are auctioned separately. A lesser-known
trend in the road sector is the increase in operations and management contracts auctioned out to the
private sector as a way to minimize the cost of road maintenance. Even if this does not finance the
roads, it avoids demanding investments in equipment and allows some degree of competition in the
sector. This is now quite common in Latin America and is picking up in the other parts of the world. .
Unbundling  in  regional  units  of  business  also  allows  the  introduction  of  competition  between
markets by comparing the performance of the same types of service in the various regions.
For ports, the promotion of interregional competition across ports (as in Brazil and Chile ) or
intra-port competition between terminals (as in Argentina, and to  a lesser extent, Brazil) allows the
performance  of  the  winners  in  the  various  segments of  the  sector to  be  compared  over  time.
continuing the competitive pressure. In some countries, vertical separation between infrastructure and
port services has been seen as the most desirable solution (as in Sri Lanka and Peru).
Finally,  for  airports,  horizontal  separation  across  regions  (as  in  Mexico)  or  vertical
unbundling of air traffic control, terminals, runways and passenger and commercial services has been
22 For details, see Campos and Cantos (1999), Nombela and Trujillo (1999), Betancour and Rendeiro (1999), Thompson and Budin
19adopted (as in Canada and Colombia). This shows that airports do not have to be treated as single,
monolithic monopolies. It is also clear that interregional competition does work, as operators are very
aware of the potential competition from other operators in their region.
5.2  How governments show that there is mnore  to reform than competition 23
Governments  have  multiple  agendas:  efficiency  concerns  and  fiscal  concerns  (including
short-term vs. long-term).  The relative importance of each item has a strong influence on the type
of  restructuring  that  is  adopted.24 Argentina's  experiences  the  first  wholesale  reform  of  the
transport sector in the 1990s, is quite revealing. Looking back, it seems that its major restructuring
of transport,  initiated in  1991 as part of a wider privatization and deregulation  strategy, provided
the leading indicator of transport sector reforms to come in developing countries. In particular,  it
showcases  the  complex  interactions  between  the  way competition  is  introduced  in  transport  to
achieve efficiency gains and at the same time address the macroeconomic objectives of government
reform.  The  most  important of  these  macroeconomic objectives are  fiscal  concerns--including
driving down the cost of subsidies to a sector traditionally funded by public financing. The outcome
is that gains  in efficiency have been achieved but  the sector continues to  be  heavily  subsidized
(although much less so than before the reforms).  After difficult renegotiations, many of the rail and
roads operators ended up with longer term contracts than anyone initially thought was necessary to
minimize the subsidy requirements.25
1998), Thompson (1997) and Juhel (1998); for the U.K. experience, see Glaister (1998).
For a longer, illustrated discussion for Argentina, see Crampes and Estache (1998).
24 Often, this is driven by whoever is in charge of reform in the sector. If the restructuring is in the hands of the Finance Ministry,
chances are that the fiscal concerns will dominate. If it is in the hands of the Transport Ministry, productive (cut costs) or dynamic
increase investment) efficiency concerns will dominate.
Many EEC countries concerned with the need to meet the Maastricht fiscal targets are in a similar situation. As they are finally
considering an increase in the role of the private sector to finance their much needed infrastructures,  they are going through many of
the same dilemmas that Argentina went through at the beginning of the decade: how can transport liberalization be implemented to
also address pressing fiscal constraints?
20Understanding the dilemmas faced by governments requires an understanding of the ways
that fiscal concerns can be addressed. Fiscal gains can be achieved in three major ways: (i) sale or
rental  of  assets;  (ii)  passing  on  the  financing  costs  of  operating  and  investing  to  the  private
operators (in many ways this means that the burden is shifted from the taxpayers to the user of the
service, which is quite important since many services tended to be under-priced or subsidized under
public operations)  ;26  and (iii) subject the private operators to the standard tax demands, rather than
formally or informally exempting them, as is often the case for public enterprises. The first method
is the main focus of most reforning  governments with  serious fiscal constraints.27  In some cases,
governments  have recognized  that it is also  fiscally profitable  to  privatize  services that  demand
huge amounts of subsidies at high delivery costs, as private operators can often cut these costs quite
quickly. Even when subsidies are needed, they can be obtained at a lower fiscal cost.  This is the
case for many railway services from the U.K. to Argentina.
Private  investors may be  tempted to play games that are not necessarily in  the interest of
consumers.  The government may end up playing along because of its desire to achieve fiscal gains
through  the  sale or  rental  of  assets.  This  automatically  creates  a  trade-off  for  the  government.
Indeed, the higher the retained degree of monopoly passed on by the government,  the higher the
willingness of private operators  to pay for the right to  run a  service.  This means that the initial
desire to fully liberalize to achieve efficiency gains may be reduced by the need to meet pressing
fiscal  needs.  The  evidence  is  quite  strong  in  the  telecommunications sector,  where  temporary
exclusivity periods are quite common, guaranteeing the government high fiscal payoffs financed by
the rent  captured  by private  monopolies from their  clients.  The rent  is typically  not as  high  in
26 Clearly, the contingent public liabilities that underlies many of these privatization efforts are serious threats to the fiscal pay-offs of
privatization and cannot be ignored in any reasonable assessment since they are often potentially at least as high as the original
subsidies the governments are trying to get rid of.
21transport,  where  modal  competition  maintains  pressure  on  the  rent,  therefore  reducing  the
willingness of  clients  to  pay  excessively  high prices  for  former  public  services.  But  for  some
airports, and for ports with little competition in some market segments, this is an issue.
In  fact,  the  recent  experience  of  the  airport  sector  points  to  another  way  in  which
restructuring  and fiscal concerns interact. In many medium to large countries, airports often benefit
from  cross-subsidies  financed  through  international  traffic  or  through  high-demand,  domestic
airports.  When considering the restructuring of the sector, the privatization teams often make the
recommendation to maintain the cross-subsidies and to sell or concession airport packages,  rather
than individual airports,  to minimize the need for the government  to have to  finance the airports
with losses, even if  it is through  explicit subsidies.  This debate is taking place  throughout Latin
America,  from Argentina to Mexico.
The incentive to condone, even temporarily,  some degree of restriction to competition is in
fact quite common.  Indeed,  railways,  ports  or  airports with  strong,  captive client  base  or  with
shared traffic  can be  used  by the  government to  achieve high  fiscal  gains.  This  is  why  access
pricing is one of the key issues-and  great business for consultants-in  this sector.  Unless access
pricing rules are defined before the business is passed on to private operators,  it is clear that rents
are being created that are harmful to users. This has long been an issue in the U.S.;  it is an issue in
the U.K.,  and  it has proven  to  be  an issue  in most  developing  and  transition  economies.  It  is
particularly  so in most  developing  countries because the need to transfer  the business  to private
operators is often so pressing that there is little time to work out the demanding details  of access
pricing.
27 Moreover, politically, it is always difficult to go to the media and the public and argue that the government did not do its best to
make the most of the "sale" of assets used to deliver services viewed by many in the population as entitlements.
225.3 The impact of ranking government goals for  the design of the competition for the market
The multiplicity of objectives also explains the multiplicity of award criteria for contracts-
whatever  their  type-observed  when  governments  organize  competition for  the  market.  The
governments  who  are  most  obviously  concerned  for  the  users,  and  who  want  to  increase  the
transparency  of the reduction that is obtained through privatization, will generally opt for awarding
the concessions to the bidder with the lowest tariff. This is quite common for toll roads or ports.
On the other hand,  governments  with  some political  concern will  set the tariffs  and  investment
obligations  and  award  the  contract  to  the  bidder  offering  to  run  the  business  for  the  shortest
duration.  This  was  the  case  for  some  toll  roads  in  Mexico.  An  alternative  is  to  award  the
concession to the bidder asking for the shortest time to recover the demanded investment, as is the
case for toll roads in Chile.
When fiscal concerns dominate, the award  can be organized to go to the bidder willing to
pay  the most to the government  for the right to provide the service,  as in Argentina's  ports.  In
some  cases,  when  demand  for  the  service  is  not  strong  enough  (such  as  low-  traffic  roads),
obtaining the best fiscal impact may also mean picking the bidder that asks for the smallest subsidy,
as with roads in Peru, for instance.  This is shows that the international experience is not leading tc
a convergence in the criteria used to pick the winners in competitive bidding because the weights
attached by governments to their multiple goals can vary across countries and  across sectors  and
within countries and sectors. These weights can vary over time as political concerns change.
236. What the new role of government in privatized transport looks like 28
To some extent, the "privatization" transaction was the easy part of getting the private sector
involved in co-financing the needs of the sector. It raises many questions that have to be tackled by
the reform teams: the forms of competition, the type of unbundling and the ranking of government
objectives. It also raises questions of sequencing, which economists tend to enjoy debating, but for
which  pragmatic reformers have a simple answer: take the path of least resistance,  make  as few
mistakes  as possible  and  get the  deal  done. The main problem with  this  is  that  it leaves  many
challenges for  the  government  that  could in  fact make  or  break future  deals.  In  practice,  this
influences  the  cost  of  capital  as the  resolution  influences  the  risk  premiums  paid  on  the  next
generation of projects.  This is why the most  difficult challenge for governments is to  prepare to
enforce  the  commitments  made  through  the  privatization  transactions.  This  means  that  after
privatization, the Transport Ministries and Secretaries have to resist the temptation to create a shadow
management of the activities they used to run.
6.1 Defining the role of economic regulation
Once the contracts have been signed and sealed, giving the private sector the responsibility for
(co-)financing and  delivering the  services, the government needs  to prepare  to  intervene only  to
ensure that competition works, as well as to check on safety and environmental concems, but not as
the manager of the business. If the govemrnment  does not have the capacity to enforce economic-and
no longer technical-regulation  of the sector, it must develop the ability to make decisions where the
resulting behaviors of all parties mimic the impact that competition would have had in the sector if it
had been possible. The agenda for the economic regulation is clear. Government intervention will be
needed if:
It is clear that the government will continue to have an important role since only the activities with sufficient demand will probably
24*  there are high legal barriers inherited from past regulatory regimes that need to be sorted
out -and  this is more common and more troublesome than usually anticipated--, 29
*  the privatized services are natural monopolies, which come with  such risks as abusive
pricing, abusive control of bottlenecks that hurt  captive shippers and  other investment
related issues-- and access pricing is high on the list of related concerns;
*  predatory pricing takes place, or
*  safety cutbacks are likely to be an easy way to reduce costs.
If  an  effective  competition  or  anti-trust  agency  is  in  place,  it  will  take  care  of  the first  three
responsibilities. 30 If not, these are to be included in the mandate of the economic regulators. This is
not  the  only  responsibility  of  these  regulators.  In  addition,  the  government  needs  to  monitor
compliance and enforce the contractual commitments-investment,  quality and service obligations-
of the private operators.
6.2. Picking the regulatory regime to address the risk concerns of the investors
Traditionally,  governments  have  relied  on  rate  of  return  regulation.  In  other  words,
governments have generally guaranteed to operators that they would recover their costs (within very
general, often generous, guidelines) and get a markup to remunerate investors-  thus the label "cost-
plus regime". Since these regimes do not give a strong incentive to operators to cut costs, they are
called low-powered regimes. The introduction in the U.K. of price caps changed all this by showing
that the regulatory regime could be designed to minimize costs. Price caps allowed the operators to
keep the cost saving they were bringing to the sector for a limited period. After three to five years,
be able to attract significant private sector interest.  It is interesting to note that increasingly, activities such as low traffic and rural
roads maintenance are being contracted out through auctions to private companies as well.
29 For details on the relevance and importance of this issue, see Kennedy (1997), Laffont and Tirole (1998) and Valletti and Estache
(1999).
25these would have to be shared with the other agents (users, and sometimes governments). The high
incentive to cut costs for the initial period makes this a high-powered regime. In many countries,
hybrid  systems  are  approached,  which  result  in  some  degree  of  immediate rent  sharing  at  the
beginning  of  the  period  of  private  sector operations.  These regimes  are becoming  increasingly
common. Table 5 provides a snapshot of the regulatory regimes and industry structure for a sample of
countries and sectors around the world.
High-powered  Airports (U.K., Australia), Buses (Singapore), Railways (U.K., Brazil), Roads
(Australia), Ports (Argentina), Others (U.K.).
Medium-  Airports (Italy, Denmark, Austria), Buses (U.K. - London, Australia - Sydney),
powered  Railways (Australia), Roads (Italy).
Low-powered  Buses (Hong Kong), Railways (Argentina, USA, Japan), Tunnels (Hong Kong).
Source:  Alexander  et al. (1999)
An often-omitted feature of the regulatory regime is that it also drives the distribution of risks
in  the business.  Low-powered  regimes are  also  low risk  regimes  since cost  recovery  is  almost
guaranteed, whatever the demand. Pure high-powered regimes, on the other hand, shift all the risks
onto the shoulders of the private operators. This matters to the extent that it influences the total risk
level faced by potential investors. In situations where initial risk is very high, this can make or break
a deal. In practice of course, things are not always that clear cut. Regulators under cost-plus regimes
can disallow expenses they consider to be unecessary, excessive or inappropriate. The problem is of
course that this can give rise to some degree of arbitrariness in the decisions. On the other hand, if
there  is  enough  control  of  costs  as  in  simplistic price  caps,  the  operators tend  to  have  strong
incentives to cut quality or safety. Moreover, the measurement of the efficiency gain to be shared
with users after an initial period can generate serious political conflicts, aswas the case in the UK.
30  A useful  reminder  by Kahn (1998)  is that  government  and competition  agencies  must resist  the temptation  of
"creating"  artificial  competition  in order  to try to showcase  quick  rate  reductions  through  implicit  or explicit  subsidies  to
26Table 6 reports the results of a recent study on the impact of the choice of regime on the
perceived risk  as measured through the "assets beta" of 48 private  transport projects  around the
world. This table first shows that on average, risk levels are not too high in the transport sector. In the
sample analyzed, the bus sector tends to be the most risky, mostly because of a series of sour deals in
Asia. The table also shows that, in general, the relationship suggested by the theory is confirmed:
high-powered regimes induce higher risks. However for some industries, the exposure to inter-modal
competition or other factors leads to a breakdown in the relationship. Rail is a good examnple  of this:
the regulation and market risk relationship holds for the U.K. and Japan, but does not hold for U.S.
companies. However, the use of averaging in the summary table masks this result to some extent..
Regulatory  Airports  Buses  Rail  Roads  Other  All
Price Caps  0.9I.0  .................  0.521  0.31  0.24  0.44
Intermediate  0.56  -0.15  i0.46
regime--  -----  . .. . . .......  0.52  0.35  V0.80  0.40
Total  0.~61  -06  0.36  _:  0.25  0.45  C  .4
Sapesize  (5)  ()(29)  - 3)  1  (8)  (48)
Source: Alexander et al. (1999)
5.3 Developing the institutional capacity to regulate
The introduction of more sophisticated regulatory regimes has also made it clear that there is EL
need to develop a major regulatory capacity within countries. In practice, the development of the-
regulatory  capacity faces two main risks. The first risk is having the regulators controlled by the
operators, and being lenient in the case of conflict. The second is having the regulator controlled by
the users or customers, and imposing demands not covered by the contract. There is also the risk that
the government does not deliver on its own contractual commitments, which increases the perception
of risks of expropriation. Sometimes, subsidies are part of the commitments (usually implicitly, since
the new entrants.  See Chapter 11  in particular.
27risk  assignment  is typically  built-into the  design  of the  regulatory  regime).  For  instance,  when
reviewing tariffs, decisions are needed on issues such as cost allocation or the calculation of the cost
of capital .These issues clearly influence the allocation of risk, profit and rents between the operators,
investors, users and the government. Of course, this raises the appearance of conflicts of interest.
Being able to deliver on governmrent  commitments is a challenging task, as experience shows.
Since contracts and all of the other supporting regulatory legal instruments are often incomplete, the
government  must  be  able  to  demonstrate  fairness  in  settling  issues  and  disputes  for  which  the
contracts provide no guidance. While no one doubts that governments can often be fair, it is useful
when restructuring the sector to also restructure its institutions in ways that include  a commitment
device that guarantees such fairness. The most comrnmon  commitment device is the creation of an
independent regulatory  authority, free fro:m  the risk of control by politicians, the government, the
operators or the users of the service. Clearly, this authority must not only be financially autonomous
but also accountable for its decisions. 31
This is where the reforms still have a way to go in most countries. The oldest experience of an
independent, integrated regulation of the transport sector is through the Surface Transport Board. Its
principal quality is that it operates in a relatively transparent and accountable environment where all
interested parties have an opportunity to present their views at all levels - before Congress, before
the agencies and before the courts.  The process of judicial review generally ensures that the agency
applies the regulatory law as intended by Congress, and that the agency engages in decision-making
based on evidence.  The main  weakness of the system is that it imposes very high compliance costs.
This has proven to be very difficult to change in this  sector, particularly where there is a significant
interest in the status quo.
31For  details, see Broadley, J. and A. Estache (1998).
28The sad fact is that there is no good news to report on new international experiences. While
regulatory processes in the U.K. have much that deserve emulation, the experience in institutional
design for regulation is probably not a model to follow. It has more regulatory agencies than it has
transport sectors to regulate. They are, in fact, in the process of merging some of the agencies as a
way to  ease the coordination of regulatory decisions. In most countries, the solution has been to
create units within the Ministry of Transport that monitor concessions or other contracts with private
operators. The main disadvantage is that in the case of disagreement with the government, conflicts
of interest  emerge  quite quickly. Various  experiences in  Latin America  suggest that the  lack of
transparency in the decision-making of these monitoring units often creates tension which is well-
reported by the press. This then becomes a source of political debate about the privatization process,
which  is based  on few facts and  many rumors,  as is illustrated by the Argentinean  and  Mexico
experience with toll roads.
To minimize these risks of excessive "politicization" of regulatory issues, a new generation of
transport agencies is being introduced, inspired by the integrated U.S. model and led by Bolivia and
Peru. Both countries have regulatory agencies that are much more independent from policy-makers.
The agencies cover all sectors and have their own sources of funding. They also rely on this funding
to sub-contract activities for which skills are required that they don't  have in-house. In addition, Peru
has built in an interesting twist. To ensure good coordination between the competing agency and the
transport regulator, one of the members of the Transport Regulation Board is also a member of the
Competition  Commission.  While  very  promising,  and  clearly  an  improvement  over  previous
arrangements, the experience with these models is still too young to  lead to any conclusion. The
challenge remains, however, and continues to be the biggest source of long-run risk. An incompetent
or controlled  regulator  is the  best  indicator that the  outcome  of privatization  will be  unfair.  In
29previous  experiences, unfairness tends to  favor the investors  and operators, rather than the users,
when contracts are poorly designed and conflicts arise.
6.4 Developing the tools of regulation
This  brings up a second aspect of institution building that is needed for fair and effective
regulation. The experience of the first generation of privatization around the world suggests that a
good regulator  without  good  tools  is  also  a  source  of conflict  and  unfairness.  For  all  practical
purposes, the main  instrument of a regulator is the contract signed with the private  operator. The
tough question now is to decide how much discretion to give to the regulators. 32The larger the degree
of discretion desired, the less detailed the contract will have to be, as the regulatory decisions will be
based on laws or decrees that have to be  interpreted by the regulators. The smaller the degree of
discretion  desired,  the  more  detailed  the  contract will  have  to  be,  thus  increasing  the  relative
importance of  contracts in  the design  of the regulatory  environment. Since all events  cannot  be
foreseen-meaning  the contract is in fact incomplete-  there will  always be  a residual  degree of
discretion. This means that the government will have to have a strong  technical capacity to make the
right and fair decisions.
The experience has generally been that weak regulators have been given too much discretion
without guidance to take the decisions on matters left out of the contracts. In developing countries,
the combination of weak regulators and poor contracts has resulted in an extremely large percentage
of contracts being renegotiated. The losers in these renegotiations have usually been the taxpayers, as
governments often end up picking up the tab for the financial consequences of renegotiations, as was
the case in Argentina.
32 For a detailed discussion, see Gomez-Ibanez (1999).
30The increasingly adopted solution is to  work with rule-based contracts  since they tend to
make regulation easier when there is overwhelming uncertainty. The challenge is to pick rules that
are fair and have minimal  information requirements. This  is  one of the advantages  of price  cap
regulation.  In  addition  to  its  incentives, it  has  the  tremendous  advantage  of  having  very  light
information requirements, at least at the time of its introduction. Five years down the road, when caps
have to be revised, the information load is similar to rate of return regulation. Rules make it easier for
arbitration, when necessary, to be efficient. But here again, the concern is with the fairness of local
arbitrators. It turns out that over the last two years most infrastructure contracts identify one of the
international arbitration agencies as the appeal agency in case of conflict.
However,  these  contracts  are  not  sufficient  in  many  cases  . Without  going  into  detail,
regulators  need to  build up  capacity  in other areas, across  country types.  A common  failure  of
privatization experiences in al country types is the failure to assess demand well enough. The two
most common reasons for private operators to ask for a revision of their contracts are that there are
cost shocks and that demand has turned out to be completely different than expected. This is because
the  public  enterprises  who  were  running  the  services prior  to  privatization  did  not  have  much
incentive to be concerned with demand.
A more cynical interpretation is that there are joint perverse incentives for both governments
and operators. The government often wants to make business look better than it is because it wants
the deal done. It takes the bet that problems, if they emerge, will have to be dealt with by the next
government. The potential operators actually want to get into the business knowing that they stand a
good chance to be able to go back to the government to negotiate better terms once they have started
operations. At that time, the transaction costs (including the political costs) for the governments of
canceling a contract without renegotiations are generally much higher than the costs of giving up
some ground by accepting some of the demands made by the incumbent. Often the outcome is that
31the government gives up too much in an effort to resolve the conflict quickly. This raises the stakes
for  demand  by  private  operators  for the following round  of  privatization  or renegotiations,  and
possibly  increases  the  incentive  to  renegotiate.  While  this  may  in  fact  cut  the  regulatory  risk
premium, as operators become convinced that they can do business with the government, it may also
mean that users or taxpayers will end up paying the bills that result from renegotiations. Note that
only playing hard ball does not work since it often results in operations being stopped and users not
getting the  service they want.  Furthermore, it increases the regulatory  risk premiums,  as seen  in
recent conflicts in Argentina's water sector.
A final common problem is illustrated by a quick review of the recent major experiences in
railway privatization. It suggests that one of the issues that few regulators can handle well and which
cannot simply be  covered by  a  contract is  access pricing. This  is  one of the key  themes  facing
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Similarly, in many countries, safety is an issue that contracts do not
address  well-a  result  of  the  risk  of  micro-management  if  too  much  is  said  about  it.  Most
importantly, this is an issue for which the institutional assignment of responsibility is not clear. This
may in fact be a symptom of another institutional problem. In addition to the multiplicity of agencies
responsible for the economic regulation of transport, there are typically many other agencies involved
in enforcing some type of non-economic regulation. Environmental regulation is the typical one, but
there are also often local land use rules that can conflict with contractual obligations. The point is that
few countries seem to be able to use the multiplicity of agencies to promote competition for effective
regulation. This multiplicity instead results in coordination problems for which every agent blames
the other. Finally,  few countries have escaped some type of  collusion problems,  either actual  or
potential, between construction companies and the government, or among other potential members of
consortia that are interested in taking over a transport infrastructure project.
327. Conclusions
It is clear that the private sector will not be the main source of financing for every mode. The
roads sector, for instance, is likely to continue to require significant public funding. Even in roads,
however,  introducing  innovative ways to  attract private  financing of maintenance and investment
needs, such as through shadow tolls, increases the cost-effectiveness of the operation of the sector.34
In fact, the experience of the  1990s suggests that private  sector involvement in transport is doing
quite a lot of good in financing transport infrastructure support services that have a high demand. 35It
clearly shows that reforming governments can be quite creative in tapping this potential, as illustrated
by the variety of restructuring models and financing designs which have been put together  across
sectors and across countries.
Many  would  also  argue the  effectiveness of  this  public-private  partnership,  as  transport
infrastructures  have  tended  to  improve  quite  dramatically  with  the  introduction  of  competitive
practices in the sector. This suggests that it is difficult to be pessimistic about the long-term prospects
for opportunities for increased private participation in transport, in particular in airports and ports,
where potential for private sector participation, and financing in particular, continues to be untapped.
Traditionally this has not been easy, nor will it be in the future.
This sector could be better at attracting competitive private capital if governments improve
their regulatory tools  and sort out the institutional mess surrounding the regulatory process, which
may be the biggest bug that reformers have not been able to get rid of!. Knowing the cost of capital,
knowing how to  be  fair to captive shippers, and having a better handle on demand  will provide
Consider also that any real economic effects from these financial events have particular consequences for the transport sector.  Since
transport is a derived demand, any decline in real economic activity will quickly be felt in traffic levels and revenues. These effects
vary by sector, especially over the medium to longer term.  Particularly hard-hit should be toll roads and passenger air transport, which
are extremely sensitive to income levels. This further reinforces the need to think of government involvement in the sector.
34 Shadow tolls have not yet convinced many experts in the sector, but the idea continues to stimulate innovative approaches to funding
the sector.
33regulators with more credibility when conflicts arise. Governments have focused too much on getting
deals done, and have generally underestimated the difficulty of taking on their new job as regulators.
While they are increasingly switching to contract-based regulation to firm up the commitments of all
parties  involved, they  are not  putting  enough emphasis  on designing  the  contracts to  anticipate
conflicts and address unpredictable situations, which increases the risk of arbitrary regulatory ruling.
This, in turn, has increased the regulatory and political risks, therefore raising the required expected
rate of return for potential investors. This makes future projects more difficult and/or costlier  and
further adds to the effects of the 1998-99 financial crisis.
The result of increased risk is seen in a self-selection bias in the type of potential entrants into
this sector. The two main groups interested are (i) the large, strong operators in the sector-typically
in tandem with local construction companies-who  feel confident that they will be able to take on the
regulators in case of conflict, or (ii) the risk takers who need to  carve their niche. Either way, the
taxpayers and/or the users are the most exposed to government, regulatory or operator failures which
result in contract renegotiations. These seem to be the norm rather than the exception in infrastructure
projects.
All of this means is that there is a risk that the gains from privatization do not reach the people
simply  because  the  governments  are  ignoring the  importance  of  their  role  to  ensure  the  fair
distribution  of  the  long-run  gains  through  the  early  creation  of  independent  and  accountable
regulatory institutions that working closely with effective competition agencies. Learning to regulate
fairly  and  effectively  at  arm's  length  may  be  the  main  challenge  for  governments  in  the next
millennium. Those who are unwilling to learn the tricks of the trade will end up being the Y2K bugs
of transport privatization, preventing users from making the most of additional investments brought
by the private sector.
For a more analytical treatment see Winston (1993).
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